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Introduction
As should be clear, I’m trying to argue for the importance of utopian thinking in 
human life. And I specifically use the term utopian thinking, rather than simply 
utopia, because I take the term utopian thinking to cover a larger area than simply 
utopia. In fact, you might say that even the notion of utopian thinking is too nar-
row, you should think in terms of something like utopian activities. I spoke yes-
terday about the cooperatives in Limoges, a form of utopian organization. Europe 
has produced many utopias, that is many descriptions of ideal societies, and some 
of these are of an extremely high literary quality. But this has had the disadvantage 
of tending to cause us to focus our attention perhaps too exclusively on only one 
aspect of utopian thinking, namely utopia as a literary image of static perfection. 
And this, in turn, can lead to a certain stunting of our understanding of the pos-
sibilities of social thought and social action. If one looks at any of the traditional 
utopias, they seem to be descriptions of a perfect, and in particular, a perfectly sta-
ble and unchanging society, which is radically different from anything we know. 
However, it seems also that utopias refer to an impossible world, so there might 
seem to be a quick and easy way to show the pointlessness of utopian thinking, sim-
ply by focusing on the impossibility of realization of any of these proposed topics. 
If the world of utopia is really impossible, then one might argue: what is the point 
of describing it, apart from simply satisfying some vain, unrealistic wish, such as 
the wish that we could live forever. Giving way to such wishes, however, is merely 
childish, and, as we mature, we should grow out of them. Actually, I think, there are 
three or perhaps four different kinds of impossibility, and it’s important to think 
about the way in which the concept of the impossible is not just socially and con-
textually specified, but in which impossible refers to different dimensions. First of 
all, there is a utopian state that is, as it were, inherently or internally impossible, for 
something like causal reasons. That is, for example, the image of a society in which 
people live and consume, but engage in no productive activity at all. That’s an im-
possible state. In the Western European peasant imagination, this is illustrated by 
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such fantasies as The Land of Cockaigne, which is depicted in this famous painting 
by Peter Bruegel the Elder, which is in the Alte Pinakothek in Munich. 
Now, in this 16th century painting, you can see people lying around, feasting on 
food that they’ve not grown, and they’re not engaged in preparing. If you look at 
the image, you can see this man is lying on his back, and the wine is dripping off 
the table into his mouth. Here we have an egg, that has legs of its own, is already 
broken open, and there’s some kind of instrument inside the egg so that you can 
eat it. Up here you can see a pig, who’s been roasted and is walking around with 
a knife ready for tranches to be cut off him. Actually, this is an image of a peasant 
idea of utopia, but of course if you look at the image you’ll see that there’s another 
aspect of utopianism in it. One aspect is that it’s an image of consumption without 
production. The other aspect of utopia is that you will have noticed that, although 
this man seems to be a peasant, because he has a thrashing apparatus, that man is 
some kind of military figure, because he has a lance, and this man has a kind of 
ermine coat. So, as you know if you’ve read Dubois, the Middle Ages had this con-
ception of the three orders of society, society was divided into three orders. Now, 
in general, that was thought to be the clergy, the people who prayed for us, the 
farmers, the people who worked for us, and the knights, the people who fought 
for us. And this I think is a slight variation on this, there’s the military function, 
the peasant consumption function, and the administrative function, and they are 
all lying around companionably around the same table. 
So there are two aspects of utopia here, one is consuming without producing, 
but the second is that the lamb has lain down with the lion, that is, the different 
social orders are in the same situation and are equal to each other, they are lying 
around in equal comfort. So it’s a kind of visual static image of a society which 
instantiates utopianism in a certain way. But, in particular, one aspect of it might 
not be impossible, it might be possible for there to be social harmony, but another 
aspect of it definitely is impossible, with the technological means available, name-
ly the idea that eggs could be grown that had legs, with which the eggs walked to-
wards the mouths of those people who need them. When the peasants merely open 
their mouth, the fowl fly into them. Of course, one has to discuss this relative to 
the technological level of those involved, but certainly in the 16th century, it’s not 
possible for a whole society to be organized around consumption without produc-
tion. So that’s a first kind of impossibility, some kind of internal impossibility. A 
slight variant of this, which I’d like to count as a second kind of impossibility, is 
one which is not strictly causal, but is based on a value incompatibility. 
As Isaiah Berlin among others has argued, it’s not at all obvious that all human 
goods are evaluatively compatible with each other. I gave that example yesterday 
of a blacksmith who wanted to be a miniature painter. A society which is maximal-
ly tolerant will not necessarily also be maximally efficient, or perhaps maximally 
well-ordered. Toleration of human deviance is a human good, but some minimal 
kind of social order and security are also human goods. This line of objection might 
be connected with a rejection of the utopian idea of harmony. It’s not difficult to 
see that human societies will never exist without conflicts, and that this is part-
ly a manner of the causal realities of our world, but also partly a question result-
ing from the fact that various human goods and virtues do not necessarily easily 
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coexist, so that struggle is endemic. So the very idea of a static human society might 
be incoherent. We’ve got verbal utopias, we’ve got visual utopias, and there can 
also perhaps be other forms of utopianism which are even less connected to writ-
ing or imagination. Both of these two senses of impossibility make no reference 
to the specifically historical or temporal dimension. They take the utopian society 
in question, as it were, in a single point in time. Now, in a third sense of impossi-
bility, utopia might describe a situation that is impossible, not for causal reasons, 
and not because it describes a maximal instantiation of values that are incompati-
ble, but rather it’s impossible because it’s internally unstable. The idea of a utopia 
is not that of a state of society at a single point of time that’s maximally good, but 
of a continuing of society that’s good. So the society might be maximally good at a 
point in time, but that might not be a form of society that is stable and could con-
tinue. That’s a third sense of impossibility. We could have a feast and pull all our 
food together and consume without producing, that might be a state that is very 
nice, but it wouldn’t be a stable state. 
Robert Nozick, one of my bête noire, gives an example that’s supposed to count 
against certain forms of utopian egalitarianism. He argues that you may well re-
distribute all the goods in a society at a certain time, and so you can have a society 
with complete equality at that time, but this state of affairs will never last, unless 
artificially and continually re-established.  Left to their own devices – and this is 
an anthropological assumption he makes – people will exchange goods and they 
will use their resources in differential ways so that, in a short time, relations of in-
equality will re-emerge. The utopian ideal of equality, then, was not one of con-
tinually redistributing goods, or draconianly prohibiting any kind of voluntary ex-
change, but the idea of a good state of society that was stable. 
A fourth sense of impossibility is the obvious one, namely the absence of ac-
cess to the utopian state from where we are. Here it’s not that the state is impos-
sible, or that it’s beyond us, but that it’s actually so far beyond our reach as not to 
be a realistic option. Thus, to take the famous example – suppose a 19th century 
society has a choice between developing its systems of roads for transport, devel-
oping a system of canals, or developing a railroad network. So, starting from point 
zero, any of these three choices is possible, and most sensible societies will opt 
for some combination. But suppose this particular society decides to put all its re-
sources into an extensive canal system. Then, if we live in the 20th century, we can 
imagine a world in which all long distance travel is by rail, that’s possible, inter-
nally consistent, it might actually be stable. There’s nothing inherently impossible 
about this, but at the same time it’s effectively out of our reach. If we had invest-
ed our resources in the 19th century into building an appropriate infrastructure, 
some rail system, then we would have something to continue to build with now. 
But starting from where we are with canals but no railways, we can’t, with the re-
sources we have, simply throw away the whole canal system, and build a full rail 
system, ex novo. There’s nothing inherently impossible about it, and it’s not even 
unstable, it’s just inaccessible. 
So, I’ll conclude then by reiterating my two basic points. First, impossible is it-
self a theoretical, not an observational or an empirical term. We should not assume 
that we antecedently know, in any situation, what is and what is not possible. Nor 
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should we assume that what is or what is not possible are fixed and invariant once 
and for all. Judgements about the possible and impossible are highly contextual and 
require careful scrutiny. This in itself is a justification of certain forms of utopian 
speculation and action as part of a larger process of evaluating how we want to live 
our lives. Second, I’d like to focus not on utopias as static pictures of perfection, 
or as full-fledged theories such as Newton’s laws of motion, much less blueprints 
– rather, we should see utopia as a certain possible field of inquiry, or a domain of 
investigation, for utopia is a human task. As the early 20th century anarchist Gus-
tav Landauer put it, this specific object domain is the realm of those vital human 
desires, the fulfilment of which is inherently impossible in our society, or purport-
edly impossible. In the 16th century this domain included the desire to have enough 
to eat without toil. Bruegel’s picture was an exploration through art of this com-
plex, and as such, it represents a kind of utopian thinking. It’s a graphic rather than 
literary form of utopian thinking, but it’s a kind of utopian thinking nonetheless. 
This domain of investigation involves a number of things: bringing out clearly 
what the human desires in question are, for example. We are not always absolute-
ly transparent to ourselves in our desires. So it’s a tricky task to determine what 
we really want. It’s not obvious, it has to be determined, that is part of the task of 
utopianism, to figure out what we want. You can’t just read it out of revealed pref-
erences, as economists think you can. We might not get a final or definitive an-
swer to this, both because some desires might be too deeply embedded, outside 
the area to which we can get cognitive access, and because our desires sometimes 
change. Utopian thinking will have to extract and construct these desires, it won’t 
in general be able to simply read them off from external behaviour. A further part 
of the investigation is trying to see whether the satisfaction of a given set of de-
sires really is impossible, or it’s merely assumed or asserted to be impossible, and 
if so, what. In addition we’ll have to formulate some hypotheses about the condi-
tions under which that, which was thought to be impossible, might after all prove 
to be attainable. 
Utopian thinking refers to this whole process, not just to a particular isolated 
element in this process. It need not make any assumptions about the complete-
ness, perfection or unchangeability of the picture it draws. This is an investigation 
of unsatisfied vital desires, without antecedent assumptions that these desires will 
necessarily have any rank ordering. We have a certain limited ability to become 
more fully aware of aspects of our situation of which we are unaware, and we also 
have the ability to call into question imaginatively investigated claims about what 
is possible and what is not. If we fail to cultivate either of these two faculties, we 
will have deprived ourselves of potentially important tools for discovering how to 
lead a better life. 
Igor Cvejić
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory 
University of Belgrade, Serbia
I have a brief question from the perspective of the cognitive-conative divide, which 
is common in the contemporary Anglo-American theory of action. You sometimes 
use a similar terminology, but you clearly and explicitly have a different approach 
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to this question and you do not accept this strict divide. I’m also not a fan of this 
divide, but my goal is to try to provoke some problems and questions that could 
possibly lead us to some discussion. I have three questions. The first question is 
very general, it refers to the conative moments. If utopian thinking is a kind of mo-
tivational impulse, it is based on certain existing needs, as a formation of thinking 
about the realization of these needs, especially this moment when you refer to Gus-
tav Landauer. If these needs are contextual, constructed within society, it would 
lead us to the conclusion that utopian thinking presupposes that my motivational 
impulse is not strictly utopian, a constructed social conative moment, and that I 
think about people with socially constructed motivations, needs and issues which 
are not utopian. Certainly, we are used to having some idea of utopia with utopian 
kinds of desires, needs, etc. So, either this utopian social structure is methodolog-
ically prior or even determines my utopian thinking, or we have to give some uto-
pian meta-position about preferred motivations, which would lead us to some dif-
ferent concept of utopia. In a practical way you gave a solution yesterday, I’d call it 
a Marxist kind of solution, that our acting really changes our needs and desires in 
the future, but I don’t think it could answer the question of thinking – is my cur-
rent utopian thinking based on existing needs that are not utopian in themselves? 
The second question is relatively connected, it is the question of the problem 
of the relation of the cognitive input to the conative states – of course, presuppos-
ing that we speak about some kind of reflexive utopian thinking, which could be, 
for example, changed in a deliberate way. If we presuppose that I could recognize 
better my needs and the needs that exist in society, the question is would it really 
change my motivation, would it be preferable, or I would simply prefer to watch 
TV shows, drink beer, get rich and screw all other people. That’s the old question 
of rational motivation, I think it is radicalising your theory (when you criticize mor-
alization) a little bit, the idea that good is in itself motivating. 
The third question is explicitly about how utopian thinking leads us to action. 
The standard belief-desire model of action presupposes that X would do a thing 
only if X has a belief that F-ing would lead to the realization of the goal Y. If utopian 
thinking is not simply wishful thinking, then this is not the case, and, according to 
these theories, an agent would not act upon his utopian motivational impulse. So 
my question is based on the question what would trigger not just utopian thinking 
but action, that is, according to this thinking and in a specific situation. At some 
moment yesterday you made a comparison with pragmatism and religious per-
sons. I think that this is not the case here because if fanatics have some beliefs that 
some F-ing would lead to the goal Y, we just find these beliefs unjustified. This is 
another problem because, with utopian thinking we don’t really believe that F-ing 
would lead to Y, we try to problematize it. It looks as if utopian thinking must be 
in some way by itself practical, in a way that it could overlap counter-utopian cog-
nition, that is, overlap mind-to-world direction of fit (the way they usually call it), 
even if it is just an internal practice of changing the way we construct our belief, 
that is how I see your position. 
But the point of this comment is that, in order to act, we must have some cog-
nitive input belief about F-ing. I really think that we must have it. Doing without it 
or, in other words, having some concrete case in this world where we could apply 
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our utopian thinking. That presupposes some knowledge and some beliefs about 
this world that allow us to apply our utopian thinking in a concrete case. My ques-
tion is: do you think that you could explicitly give some model of action (because 
obviously this usual desire-belief model doesn’t work) that could not just justify 
utopian thinking as a good idea, but justify the possibility of concrete acts moti-
vated by utopian thinking. I have some ideas from some counter-perspectives from 
theories of emotion, which are against the cognitive-conative divide, but I’d just 
like to hear your answer.
Mark Losoncz
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory 
University of Belgrade, Serbia
As is well-known, there is a long history of the critique of utopia and utopian think-
ing, especially in conservative thought. However, I don’t want to focus on the his-
tory of political ideas, but on an even more radical critique, on the philosophical 
critique of possibility as such. Philosophers who are often mentioned as represen-
tatives of Lebensphilosophie elaborated a devastating critique of possibility – I am 
referring to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Bergson. Just as they criticized the con-
cept of nothing (nihil) they refused the modality of possibility as a pseudo-concept, 
as an illusion, as a false problem. They emphasized that the concept of possibili-
ty is merely negative, given the fact that it expresses a paradoxical existence that 
lacks effective existence. Within this framework, the realization of a possibility is 
nothing else than a neutral translation of something that is already given into the 
sphere of effective existence. Bergson claimed that the pseudo concept of possi-
bility is the result of an illusory retrospective projection of an existing reality into 
the past. So, in his text entitled “The Possible and the Real”, he refused the concept 
of possibility and impossibility altogether. On the other hand, he evoked true cre-
ativity based on the heterogeneity and virtuality of duration. Schopenhauer refused 
possibility and impossibility as concepts of reflection. According to this, he intro-
duced two concepts of reality – Wirklichkeit, on the one hand, which contains the 
modality of possibility and which is merely the result of abstraction, and Realität 
as a truly existing reality. Finally, and here I’m relying upon the interpretation of 
Arnaud François, Nietzsche refuses possibility as an expression of the false other-
worldly hope. And finally, the theory of eternal return aims at the affirmation of 
an absolutely immanent life beyond possibility and impossibility. 
To sum things up, one might reconstruct not only the history of utopias but also 
the history of anti-utopian thinking. What is more, the philosophical radicaliza-
tion of the critique of utopian thinking shows that there could also be a deep de-
sire which regards the liberation from the dangerous illusions of possibility which 
would have a certain therapeutic effect. It seems to me that every theory of utopia 
should be able to deal with these aspects of desire. Maybe there are also dreams 
of a world without possibilities. Now I would like to complete the first part of my 
intervention with a short reference to a contemporary philosopher, Giorgio Ag-
amben, who also elaborated an alternative philosophy of possibility, but from an 
entirely different point of view. Namely, under the influence of certain scholastic 
philosophers, Agamben emphasizes that the Aristotelian concept of possibility, 
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dynamis, could also mean ‘to not do’ or ‘not be’. Thus, potentiality is not merely a 
privation of effective existence that precedes actuality, but it has a power of its own. 
To put it differently, one could stop the transition from potentiality to action by 
making some potentialities inoperative, by suspending them. It is no coincidence 
that Agamben uses the terms ‘weak messianism’ and ‘the power of the weak’. As 
we know, he suggests that the political theory of liberation depends on whether we 
can have a new relation to the category of possibility. If so, one might ask whether 
utopian thinking necessarily has to focus on affirmation and creation, or we could 
experiment with a merely negative strategy that would make some power mecha-
nisms inoperative. Would this strategy be utopian or not? 
Finally, I would like to make a very short comment concerning the (allegedly) 
vain, unrealistic wishes, childish fantasies. What I found extremely exciting in the 
unorthodox Marxism of Ernst Bloch is that he elaborated an alternative theory of 
ideology that could appreciate such wishes and fantasies. Instead of refuting them 
as an expression of an irrational relation to the world, he claimed that we should 
perceive them as signs of unrealized expectations in bourgeois society, signs that 
point to alternative realities. In other words, he refused the Aufklärer position from 
which one could simply devalue these phenomena. He analysed fashion, orientalism, 
the books of Karl May, or even the story of Aladdin in this manner, as an expres-
sion of the desire for non-places, that tells us something about the dissatisfaction 
with the world. So one might ask whether a theory of utopian thinking must neces-
sarily make a rigid distinction between realistic and unrealistic utopias or, instead, 
it should not underestimate even the most modest ways of alternative thinking. 
Jelena Pešić
Faculty of Philosophy 
University of Belgrade, Serbia
I will be brief. My question would be to some extent similar to Igor’s. I’m a sociol-
ogist, so my question would be somehow determined by my background. If utopi-
an thinking involves an extraction of basic human desires and fulfilment of basic 
human needs, the question which arises is whether we could ever agree on what 
these needs and desires are and, more importantly, what is the satisfactory level 
of their fulfilment. You have pointed out in one of your texts that these needs are 
historically changeable, but I would like to say that they are not only historically 
changeable, but they also vary within one society, across different social groups. In 
that respect, I’m wondering whether we could escape the claim that utopian think-
ing is always particularistic, and that it reflects the needs and desires of certain so-
cial groups. The question that arises from that is which groups or collective action 
utopian thinking is able to motivate, and under which conditions. 
Raymond Geuss
Obviously I can’t respond to all of those points, I’m sorry about that. Let me start 
with the one where I think I have something relatively useful and helpful to say 
– let me start with Mark. The first point is that I assume that in any given  society 
the distinction between necessary and possible may be flexible, that is, that in 
any given society certain things might in fact be possible that are considered to be 
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impossible. I still keep the concept of possibility as a central part of my thought. 
As we know, a lot of people have thought that’s a big mistake. You mention Ni-
etzsche and Schopenhauer and Bergson. Of course, one could also in a certain 
sense mention Spinoza. You all remember the famous example of Spinoza: if the 
arrow is shot from the bow, and if the arrow had been given consciousness, the ar-
row would be thinking not ‘I’ve been shot from a bow’, but ‘I want to go’. So that 
the whole way of thinking about the human world as if there are possibilities is a 
mistake. It’s an illusion. 
That is a very, very powerful argument, for which I have a certain sympathy, but 
it seems to me that the point of view from which it’s possible to see the world like 
that is, if you think in Nietzschean terms, not a human point of view. That is, that 
might actually be right, it might well be the case that there is no such thing as pos-
sibility but, for us as humans, we don’t know what a human life would look like in 
which we really thought about ourselves in that way, except if we accepted certain 
extreme forms of Buddhism or religious thought perhaps. If you could accept cer-
tain extreme forms of religious thought, then perhaps you could become completely 
satisfied with seeing your life as one in which you had no possibilities. That’s what 
Max Weber would have called one of the Virtuosenleistungen of religious belief. You 
can really not see yourself as having any choices at all. Now, that is not an argument 
because, as it were, metaphysically you might actually be right, and that might well 
be the case that there is no place for possibility in our world. But I’m not superman. 
We are not supermen, we’re still human beings, and I’m trying to talk in the context 
of political human beings trying to live in the form of human life that we’re accus-
tomed to, and I think in that context, if this is an illusion, it’s a very powerful illusion. 
I simply grant that, that you might well be right, but I’m making that assumption. 
Your second point, something about the possibility of negative utopias, that is, 
utopias that didn’t consist in acting, but consisted in failing to act. And, of course, 
that’s a major topic in one of the philosophies I’m particularly interested in – Ador-
no’s. Adorno is all about negative utopian thinking. When Adorno talks about Alban 
Berg’s opera, Wozzeck, Wozzeck is a negative utopia. All works of art are supposed 
to be in some sense negative utopias. That’s connected of course in Adorno with 
this thing he calls the Bilderverbot, the prohibition on graven images. So Adorno 
thinks all thought has to be utopian, but it must never be positively utopian, be-
cause if it’s positively utopian it’s going to be the golden calf, it’s not going to be 
real utopia. I’m very happy to accept that, I don’t know really what I can make of 
that, but that’s my response to your two points.
The first set of comments, let me put some of what you said in my own terms. It’s 
a question about the relation between people who are engaged in utopian thinking, 
between the producers and the consumers of utopia, that is, between the person 
who says I have a utopian project and the person who is supposed to be receiving 
the message of this utopian project. And you were asking: don’t I essentially fail 
to look at an important factor here, namely that utopian thinking doesn’t exist, as 
it were, in a vacuum? It doesn’t occur in a vacuum, it occurs because of concrete 
people who are making concrete projects.  And so, do I, as a utopian thinker, have 
to exempt myself in some sense from the ideological illusions that are around me? 
Don’t I have to give some account of my own motivation for developing the utopian 
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project, or can I simply assume that my motivations need not be called into ques-
tion? And am I trying to give a utopian project for others or for myself? 
That’s the first complex of things you were talking about. I completely agree, 
I’m trying to get away from the idea that the way to think about utopia is: Mr X 
sits down, he takes the ethnographer’s view of society, he’s like the administrator, 
he tells society what their needs are, and then people act on that. I’m trying to get 
away from that model, I’m trying to say that there are other ways of thinking about 
this, and part of what this will be of course is that the person who is painting a 
picture or writing a book or suggesting in the assembly that we have a coopera-
tive, reflects on his own position and the nature of his own motivation in making 
this proposal. And, of course, my own motivation might be very different from the 
structure of the people I’m talking to, and that might be a very systematic problem 
that needs to be taken account of. 
The second set was about the cognitive status of these utopias, you talked about 
the cognitive input. What I’m inclined to say is something which I think I can say 
– if I make a utopian proposal, that is some kind of suggestion that there are some 
vital needs that you have that I’m articulating. And if they really are vital needs, you 
won’t necessarily immediately recognize them as such, because you might have var-
ious kinds of resistance to it. But if, in the long run, I’ve given this utopian project 
as good a run for its money as can be given, and you still refuse to accept it, then 
there’s nothing I can do, I’ve shown myself to be wrong. Maybe it’s not a cognitive 
failing, maybe it’s more practical. The cognitive element is an important element 
in it, but the crucial element is an element of the ability on the part of the people 
to accept these suggestions, it’s more like the purported effect of psychoanalysis, 
that you come to accept a certain interpretation of your behaviour. That’s not de-
tached from cognitive things, but it’s not exactly the same thing. So that’s the most 
I can say to the second point. The third point about utopian thinking and action 
– there I think you’re right. I don’t have much to say about that, I tried to gesture 
to Morus and the notion of obliquus ductus, indirect methods, but that’s no more 
than a gesture, and I haven’t really said much about that. 
Your question then, Jelena – I don’t know how much of this I should talk about. 
As you know, I think that it’s really important to distinguish categorically between 
needs and desires. The normal way of presenting the concept of need is: I want, I 
desire, I desire very much, I need. And I need is an intensification of I desire. But 
I think that David Wiggins really saw the central point about this in an essay he 
wrote in the 60s, which is that I need is not an intensification of I want. They are 
two completely categorical kinds of claims. To say that I want or desire is to speak 
of an impulse that I have in a certain direction, it’s to speak from the point of view 
of a subject who’s moving out. To say that I need is to take an external point of 
view and talk about a structural relation that must exist. So when I say I want a 
pen, that’s referring to my impulse to have a pen. When I say I need a pen, I need 
a pen doesn’t mean I want it very much. It means, looking at my life from the out-
side, and seeing the projects that I have such as writing, you can see that this object 
plays an essential role in that project, whether I know about it and want it or not. 
Now, in general I will know and therefore want what I need. But although that’s 
in general the case, it’s not the case in every particular respect. And what seems 
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to me to be very important in the Marxist tradition, a thing which has been com-
pletely lost sight of in economics, is that they represent two different categories. 
The economist wants to operate with a single category, the category of preference, 
in particular the category of revealed effective preference. What there is is what 
people want, that’s all there is. And I’m keen to say that Marx was onto something, 
there are problems with it, but he was onto something in saying that it isn’t just 
that I want and desire various things, it’s also the case that I can say that I need cer-
tain things, and you can therefore investigate the relationship between my needs 
and my wants and desires. They are not the same thing, since they are approach-
ing the same world from two different perspectives, and it’s the ability to see that 
world from both of these perspectives at the same time, that gives social thinking 
its oomph. That is, what’s really important to see is that there are three things you 
have to look at. First, there is what actually moves me to do things, there’s what I 
think I’m doing, so there’s desire in the sense of what actually moves me. There’s 
recognized desire, there’s what I know moves me. There are preferences, what I 
know moves me is what I can articulate. Then there are needs, and to have a social 
theory you have to be able to look at the human world through all three of those 
lenses at the same time. You have to look at it through the lens of how people are 
actually acting, what’s actually moving them: through what they think they are 
doing, and through what they need seen through the context of some analysis of 
vital functions. 
Now you will say – and it’s absolutely right – doesn’t this concept of need have 
authoritarian potentialities to it. Because someone has to say – the strength of lib-
eralism is the strength of non-paternalism. Namely, you want to know what’s good 
for me – what’s good for me is what I say, and I’m the final goal for that. And that’s 
the strength of liberalism. But that’s also the weakness of liberalism, because it’s 
not the case that I always know what’s best for me. Much of my life has been rec-
ognizing why, in certain contexts, I didn’t know what’s best for me. So we have to 
accept that there’s some way in which we give weight to the way people see the 
world, but we also have to accept that there are limits to that correctness with which 
they see the world, and it must be possible to look at that world from the outside, 
and look at them in terms of some analysis of their vital functions, and that anal-
ysis will of course then lead to an analysis of what they need. Now, you’re abso-
lutely right – two things: this distinction becomes much more difficult to maintain 
if you add to what I’ve said that human desires are changing historically and are 
changing sociologically, and human needs are changing. It’s one thing abstractly 
to say we’ve got desires, we’ve got needs. It’s a much more  complicated thing to 
say there are desires and there are needs, when we admit that both of them are 
developing historically. 
So I grant all of that, and I also grant that at this point it becomes important to 
see the political dimension of this, which is: who says which are the human needs. 
Agnes Heller of course wrote this famous book about the dictatorship over needs, 
and in a way what I’m saying is you can retain the focus on a distinction between 
desire and need, or focus on the distinctive impulse, without necessarily thinking 
that that means you can have an authoritarian dictatorship over what counts as 
needs. Now that means you’re going to have complicated democratic politics in 
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which you have discussion of desires, needs, etc. That will be very complicated, 
and of course one will have to take into account all the things you’ve talked about, 
about the sociological differences of who’s needs are being met and whose aren’t 
and at what price, but that’s the way I’d like to move with that. 
Željko Radinković
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory 
University of Belgrade, Serbia
Ich möchte hiermit auf die für das utopische Denken konstitutive Ambivalenz zwi-
schen dem vorgestellten, imaginierten Konstrukt und der Möglichkeit seiner Re-
alisierung reagieren. 
Mir scheint, dass in dieser Hinsicht ein Hinweis auf die produktive Kraft die-
ser Ambivalenz praktisch durchaus relevant sein kann, jedoch nicht genügt, so-
lange der modalllogische Charakter dieser “utopischer Differenz”, dieses für das 
utopische Denken charakteristischen Modallgefälles Wirklichkeit-Möglichkeit 
nicht geklärt ist. Kurzum: Von welcher Möglichkeit sprechen wir, wenn wir vom 
Utopischen sprechen? 
In diesem Zusammenhang würde ich die transzendentalphilosophische Frage-
stellung vorziehen, weil sie im Sinne der transzendentalen Dialektik eine Antwort 
auf dieses Problem zu bieten scheint. Demnach sei die Utopie bzw. die utopische 
Urteilskraft im Sinne vom regulativen Gebrauch der Ideen zu betrachten, insofern 
wir die antinomischen Struktur des utopischen Denkens richtig erfassen sollen. 
(Warum antinomisch? Es geht nämlich um den Status eines Transzendens, zu dem 
wir uns sowohl thetisch als auch antithetisch verhalten können. Die wahre Natur 
der oben erwähnten Ambivalenz ist diese antinomische Struktur.) 
Die Utopie als regulative Idee hat auch Richard Saage im Sinne, wenn er sagt:
“Die Gefahr utopischer Ideen besteht in ihrem Umschlag ins Autoritäre, wenn 
sie nicht als regulative Ideen verstanden werden, sondern als Rezepte, die Eins-zu-
Eins umzusetzen sind. Realisierte Utopien müssen notwendig repressiv werden, 
weil sie dann gezwungen sind, andere utopische Alternativen zu unterdrücken.” Die 
Realisierung nimmt der Utopie ihre normative Kraft, die nur zur Geltung gelangt, 
wenn die Differenz zwischen dem utopischen Konstrukt und der Wirklichkeit be-
stehen bleibt. (Es geht also nicht darum, diese antinomische Struktur des Utopi-
schen aufzulösen, sondern sie angemessen zu erfassen, indem verstanden wird, 
dass es sich hier um den regulativen Gebrauch der Ideen handelt.) 
Als regulative Idee hat die Utopie – frei nach Kant – keine Gegenstände bzw. 
keine neue Erkentnis zu geben, sondern eine gewisse Ordnung in Erkenntnis- und 
Handlungsbegrifflichkeit zu bringen. Die Utopien können die Erkenntnise und 
Handlungen orientieren und ordnen. Sie stellen gewissermaßen die höherstufigen 
Möglichkeiten dar, d. h. solche, die nicht zu realisieren sind, sondern die Möglich-
keitsräume eröffnen und organisieren. 
Beispeil: Francis Bacon (Neu Atlantis)
Das utopische wird nicht nach dem Grad des Realisierten bestimmt, sondern 
nach ihrem Potenzial der Eröffnung der Möglichkeitsräume. 
Weshalb verliert eine Utopie, die zum Teil realisiert ist (wie Neu Atlantis), nicht 
an ihrem utopischen Charakter?
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Predrag Krstić
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory 
University of Belgrade, Serbia
I would, first of all, like to thank Professor Geuss on this rare opportunity – as this 
year marks half of a millennium since the publication of More’s Utopia – to dis-
cuss with him precisely that which he seems to bear witness to better than anyone 
else: the possibility of non-doctrinary utopian thought in an age hostile to uto-
pianism. My questions concern one doubt that is sparked by this commendable 
striving. In such an attempt to provide an apologia for utopia as Geuss’s, the focus 
is understandably on finding a justificatory function for utopian thought, that is 
on the process of ‘extricating’ from it the importance and the mission that it must 
still have for us today: Geuss thus wishes to ‘investigate the way in which wishing, 
hoping, and desiring interact with knowing; to throw light on connections that 
might otherwise escape notice; provide ideal types that can stimulate further think-
ing; serving as a source of useful hypotheses’; and, instead of offering  ‘categories 
of immediate action’ and definite answers, he asks the reader to ‘reflect on such 
things as the socially recognised limits of that which is possible, the consequences 
and conditions of what we desire, the mutability of our needs’. One nevertheless 
gets the impression that the concept of utopian thought is so reductively and, to 
an extent, normatively reformulated that some of the classical, and perhaps equal-
ly valuable, elements of the complex of utopian thought are left out. To put it as a 
question – hasn’t the tradition of utopian thought been significantly impoverished 
precisely by the arguments which have undoubtedly managed to convince us that 
thought can be ‘cleansed’ of utopian elements only at its own peril, but arguments 
which have also reconfigured these elements into some kind of ‘realistic’ utopia or 
hypothetical utopian speculation, into a contextualized utopia, one that no longer 
needs to be closed, complete, stable and immutable, but that is rather linked with 
historical transformations and the development of human needs?
It seems to me that giving up a ‘picture of society in which everything is op-
timally arranged, in every aspect unsurpassably good’, giving up the idea of ‘un-
changing perfection’ doesn’t necessarily mean that we can (or have to) do away 
with one common element that we find in every form of utopian thought – one 
that projects, after all, a certain kind of stasis, resistance to further dynamic, mo-
tion, complexity of the world, that projects an end to ‘bad kind of complications’ 
(that thereby also projects unsurpassability, because there is no further need for 
surpassing) – in other words, the common element which presumes that at least 
some aspect of society is thought of as optimally aranged once and for all. To put 
it more acutely, utopia doesn’t have to be total, it doesn’t have to project a society 
that has solved all its problems, but it can, or has to, think of at least one of them 
as definitely solved. It is my impression that the final argument of the paper “Some 
Varieties of Utopia” refers precisely to this kind of ‘non-comprehensive’ complete-
ness, as well as the example of universal healthcare in “Realism and the Relativity 
of Judgment”. The question, however, remains whether, for example, a picture of 
a world without illness or disease would also count as one such desirable kind of 
utopia? Or that of a world without war, hunger or forced labor? Or whether, on the 
contrary, this would already constitute an unjustifiable step toward the pacification 
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of all tensions that resembles the unfounded ‘utopianism’, in the sense of ‘lack[ing] 
the specification of a mechanism for realising the utopian state’? As it seems to me 
that the latter is true, I would also like to ask: isn’t the contemporary ‘responsible’ 
kind of utopian thought, as one might call it, confined for this reason to the last 
defensive line, to offering merely the examples of minimal and totally ‘realistic’ 
visions? But, to what extent can we still call that ‘utopian’ in any sense of the word 
– and not simply a political program; how much of the ‘utopian’ is left when we 
do away completely with the element of the ‘definite solution’, and why wouldn’t 
we rather speak then, in terms of classical political philosophy, of a ‘political ide-
al’, or even a project of reform?
If this intuition is correct to any degree, wouldn’t we have to exclude from such 
a reduced tradition of ‘desirable’ utopian thought almost all (not incidentally) ‘is-
lands’, except perhaps Bacon’s New Atlantis: the one from Plato’s Critias as well as 
More’s Utopia and even Huxley’s Island? All these visions include – the first one 
in the form of memory, the second as fantasy, the third in a resigned manner as a 
failed attempt – what You rightfully point out: the withdrawal from the world as 
it is, with a specifically utopian fundamental rejection of this world. They see this 
world, however, as shot through precisly with the kind of freedom-negating, un-
worthy social dynamic that the ‘island’ visions should prove to be unnecessary. In 
one inspired paragraph from Minima Moralia, Adorno contrasts the image of the 
linear expansion of productive forces, the increase of production, the never-ending 
creation and growth, the obese voracity, the image of the imperative of expansion, 
of gleichmacherei, the swollen collectivity as the blind frenzy of making – he con-
trasts this image with Maupassant’s vision of ‘lying on the water and watching the 
sky in peace’, of not doing anything, like an animal, of not being anything, ‘with-
out any further designation or accomplishment’. Would such form of resistance to 
the ‘logic of capital’ today be unacceptable, left outside of the scope of justifiable 
visions due to its aspiration to a genuine state of peaceful completeness? Or would 
precisely such vision provide the kind of ‘fertility, suggestiveness and stimulation’ 
that You consider to be constitutive of the ‘right’ kind of utopian thought?
If one were to use strictly philosophical terminology, one could perhaps say that 
You point out carefully the problems of ‘absolutism’, but not of ‘contextualism’: it 
isnt’ clear how the latter manages to avoid arbitrarity, ad hoc judgment and ac-
tion and how it can accomplish more than simply demonstrating the irreducibili-
ty of every nominalized particular situation in its concrete complexity, and how it 
manages not to preclude any kind of ‘principled’ judgment. The attempt to con-
nect ‘realism’ and the aspiration to the impossible is infinitely interesting, inspir-
ing and instructive, nevertheless the fact remains (not only mental but historical as 
well) that realism which pays attention to the context, in its abandoning of trouble-
some universal standards, ends up in some form of conservatism, the standpoints 
of which one wouldn’t exactly call utopian to say the least – quite the contrary. 
Edmund Burke would already be a decent example. In the Preface to Politics and 
Imagination, You reject the idea that Conservative Realpolitik should be contrast-
ed with utopian speculation, arguing that even the deepest kind of political con-
formism and any defense of the status quo require acts of imagining of some kind. 
However, as You lucidly note in the essay ‘Authority: Some Fables’ from A World 
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Without Why, drawing on Hegel, Marx and Freud, the role of the imagination in 
politics has more often been ‘to reinforce the hold of the past over the present’, 
than the ‘production of unrealistic fantasies about a utopian future’. The nostal-
gia for the golden age and its gorgeous landscapes, however, has politically always 
had the function of conserving an idealized origin and, at best, the function of a 
reasonable word of caution to the unbridled optimism of what we usually call the 
utopian projection of a bright future. Since it seems that You in large part accept 
this objection, how does Your dichotomy of realism/moralism relate to the dichot-
omy of political empiricism/rationalism of Talmon and Oakeshott, for example, 
or even with the traditional division between utilitarian and deontological ethics?
Srđan Prodanović
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory 
University of Belgrade, Serbia
I wish to focus my comments or questions on three relatively interconnected prob-
lems. First, I agree with the idea that we should stop making relatively useless anal-
ogies between utopian thinking and any kind of finite projections or blueprints, 
as well as viewing this form of thinking as something that necessarily has no con-
nection with concrete everyday experience. However, even if we accept Geuss’s 
position that utopian thinking is ultimately a form of posing questions, there still 
remains the issue whether this ‘method’ of questioning (of social practice) is pri-
marily an individual /private or collective/public endeavour. I am not saying that 
we have here some sort of a binary opposition. My question mainly pertains to 
strategy. If we paraphrase the words from the second essay in Geuss’s World with-
out Why: when we are using utopian thinking, do we first need to break down the 
familiar forms of everyday speech (and then perhaps in consequence certain rou-
tine patterns of action and interaction); or do we first need to create positive new 
meanings, ways of speaking and acting, and eventually modes of living?
2. In light of these issues, how do we envision social engagement that would be 
driven by utopias and the role of intellectuals?
3. When this type of non-dogmatic utopian thought eventually generates some 
sort of social action, does its inherent openness imply that utopian social move-
ments cannot have rigid hierarchies or organizational structures? Was the Occupy 
movement in any sense utopian?
Raymond Geuss
May I start with Predrag’s question – you put your finger, of course, on what is the 
really central issue for me. Which is: I want, at the same time, to propound a cer-
tain kind of realism, which means, in some sense, I want to connect all forms of 
thinking with action, and that means I’m going to have to take some existing struc-
tures for granted, that’s what realism to some extent means. I can analyse them in 
various ways, but I have to start from them. And I want to combine that with uto-
pianism, which, whatever it is, doesn’t have that form. And I fully admit that I have 
not gotten very far with that. I do want to make clear in response to something 
you said – I of course do not mean to deny that there can be definitive solutions to 
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some problems. I certainly do not mean that, when I say that utopian projects are 
not best understood as blueprints for perfection, therefore one cannot ever think 
one has found a definitive solution of a particular problem. 
Let me give you an example that is close to me, because it is part of the tradi-
tion of utopianism that I grew up with. News from Nowhere by William Morris, 
they go out of their way to present a man who is one of the unhappy people in the 
future; he doesn’t like the future, he pines for the old days of grandeur and trage-
dy and the existential, and this is an important port of Morris’s project. Morris is 
not saying that there won’t be people like that who will be unhappy. They are very 
unhappy, and he is not morally condemning their dissatisfaction, but what he is 
saying is, despite the fact that they are dissatisfied – and there is some reason for 
them to be dissatisfied – we have a definitively better society now. 
So I wouldn’t describe the world from News from Nowhere as having defini-
tively solved a problem; I would say, though, it is definitively better. From the fact 
that it’s definitively better, it doesn’t follow that everyone in it is happy. There is 
this man who is justifiably unhappy, there is the married couple who have vari-
ous problems. There are problems there, it’s not a universal solution to all prob-
lems, it’s not a panacea, but it can fail to be a panacea while still being an advance 
over the society in the past. My intention is to construe these things in such a way 
that you can recognize that there is no single solution to all these problems, and 
that there will be remaining things and still say: we have isolated some genuine-
ly vital human needs and we’ve satisfied them. And that’s all you need to say, but 
of course what a vital human need is is a question for interpretation, and there I 
think I probably am – just to refer to Željko’s comments – I probably am further 
away from various Kantian ways of thinking than you would like, and I am closer 
to contextual and historical ways of thinking. And perhaps I’m wrong about that, 
but I believe that you’ve correctly diagnosed a number of problems with the con-
textualist view, I think those problems exist, but they are nevertheless less serious 
than the problems that would be associated with absolutism. 
Another thing that I read out of your comments, which I think is also further 
criticism of my perspective, is that I think you saw quite rightly that, by virtue of 
trying to make the notion of utopian thinking more flexible, I am very much in 
danger of giving it no content. I’m very much in danger simply of identifying it 
with the imagination. Ideally, there is the imagination as a category, there is uto-
pian thinking, then there is the kind of utopian thinking which is the blueprint for 
perfection. I’m trying to distinguish utopian thinking from these blueprints for 
perfection, but it isn’t clear that, in doing that, I haven’t simply moved it so far in 
the direction of simply identifying it with imagination. If even the conservatives 
who want to reproduce the status quo have to appeal to people’s imagination, and 
if there is no distinction between appealing to people’s imagination and utopia-
nism, then you might say my whole project doesn’t make any sense at all. So I do 
think they are all very fair criticisms, and I wish I could say something more about 
them, but thank you for that.
Željko, I’m going to try to rephrase some of the things you’ve said in a way that 
might not look natural and familiar to you, but tell me whether you can somehow 
see what you were trying to say in what I’m saying. Three different kinds of things: 
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there’s the notion of a utopia that can be realized, or parts of which can be realized 
– New Atlantis, parts of that are realized. Second, there’s the notion of utopia as 
a regulative thought, Kantian regulative thought. Now, of course, we know that a 
Kantian regulative thought, as you said in your presentation, has the property that 
it cannot be realized. If we have a regulative thought, this thought tells us which di-
rection to go in, it says: every time you find a causal nexus, always look for a further 
cause. That’s a rule which tells us how to proceed, but again Kant thinks, of course, 
that if I have the regulative principle which says: every time you see an event look 
for a cause, you follow the regulative principle, but it’s a mistake to try to transform 
the regulative into a substantive or constitutive principle, that is to say that there is 
one cause which is the cause of every cause. So the regulative principle says: always 
look for causes, but the mistake is to think that always looking for causes means that 
there is a final cause that is the cause of everything. And you’re appealing to that. 
So you might think that, in Platonic terms, there is the ideal circle but no real 
circle can be like the ideal one, there’s this utopian difference between the two of 
them. The first notion that you talk about is this notion of the thoughts that are 
impossible but in fact can be realized, you have the idea of a submarine and then 
it’s realized. The second is a thought that inherently isn’t the kind of thing that can 
be realized. Then you’ve got the third one, though, which is also extremely inter-
esting, which is a sort of Heideggerian thought, which is that utopia shouldn’t be 
understood, as it were, as if it’s a project that might or might not be realized, and it 
also ought not to be understood as a perfect conception, which, however, you know 
can never be realized. But rather, utopian thought is like the Heideggerian open-
ing of a domain for inquiry. You remember when Heidegger talks about Aristotle, 
and he says: the really important thing about Aristotle is that he for the first time 
opened up the field of there being such a thing as physics; by construing the world 
as bodies in motion, he made possible the development of physics. Now, that’s a 
different sense of utopian thinking, that’s not a sense of utopian thinking that can 
be realized or not, acting in such a way that produces the preconditions for other 
things is not something that can be realized and it’s not a regulative principle. It’s 
a different kind of thing, what Heidegger later calls Stiftung. So there’s Verwirkli-
chung, there’s Normativitaet, Regulativitaet and Stiftung. 
Three different ideas that you have in your discussion, and I think all of them 
are really important. I’m trying here to move utopianism both away from the idea 
that a utopian project is a total blueprint, and away from the Kantian idea that it’s 
a regulative thing which can never be realized. So I was trying to move it away from 
both these things. Now, I understand that you resist that, and you have a good ar-
gument that you can use there. Namely (I’m putting words in your mouth), your 
suggestion is that there is some way in which precisely what you call the utopian 
difference can be a stimulation to further investigation. So that it isn’t enough to 
do as I do, and to say you can’t realize it fully, you have to realize that the fact that 
certain things can’t be realized fully is itself a kind of Ansporn, it is itself a kind of 
motivation or stimulation, it can be a motivation for stimulating further utopian 
energies, and I agree with that. So I’m sorry, I don’t know that I disagree with you 
sufficiently to respond. All I can say is I found that interesting and I think that I 
can do something with that.
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Srđan, the first question was about individual meaning, public meaning, private 
meaning, everyday life and it’s role and the generation of new meanings. Obviously, 
it won’t be news to you that I’m not in favour of the idea that meanings are private 
phenomena, or that we should think of this process of utopian thinking as a private 
phenomenon. That’s why I kept saying: don’t think about the picture or text, think 
about the whole process, which is a process of investigating and thinking about de-
sires, and, I might say, the process of the reception of these. I haven’t actually talk-
ed about these – partly because I haven’t had time – but I’m thinking that, if you 
think about utopian thinking, the minimal unit should be the one that is expanded 
beyond the mere artefact, and it will include these things. Of course, it won’t be 
private, and, as you know, one of the things I disapprove of most strongly in Rorty 
was this notion of individual, private vocabularies of giving meaning to things. 
But you are also right that I tend to be on one side rather than the other of the 
great philosophical divide about everyday life and common language. Which is, 
there’s, roughly speaking, the late Wittgenstein and there is, roughly speaking, Ador-
no. The late Wittgenstein says (it’s a bit of exaggeration, but he says): philosophy 
changes nothing, it leaves everything as it was, everyday language is fine the way 
it is, it only becomes toxic when we begin to reflect and make these philosophical 
constructs; philosophy is just therapy, getting rid of these things, and then every-
thing will be fine. My association with that is that Wittgenstein has this idea that 
there is this Heile Welt, the healthy world, ‘zdravi svet’, the romantic notion – the 
Heile Welt is everyday language. The other side is Adorno, which is that if societies 
really are totalities, and if there is something deeply wrong with our society – he 
thinks that what’s deeply wrong is something about the dis-relation between the 
possibilities that we have and what we make of these possibilities. 
For Adorno, the main instance of the evil of the world is the phenomenon of 
California. California shows why the world is evil, because it has wonderful pos-
sibilities and has been made into an inferno by human use of these possibilities. 
There is nothing wrong with starving in the Middle Ages, because, to some extent, 
you couldn’t do anything about it. But there’s a lot wrong with starving in the mod-
ern world, because we could do something about it and we don’t. So it’s that dis-
crepancy between wollen and können.  And if you think that societies are totalities, 
then that evil permeates the whole of the world, there is no innocent thing. Even 
everyday interactions are the reverse of innocent. And I must say that you can’t hold 
those two views at the same time, they are just not compatible. I just think Adorno 
is more likely to be right about that, and that we must be scrupulously careful and 
reflective even about things that look to be most innocent things in the world. That 
means that I have a kind of scepticism about appeals to the health-inducing prop-
erties of participation in everyday life; that’s not an argument, just an explanation. 
Second, utopian thinking and social critique. That’s a complicated issue, of 
course I tried to say a little bit about this as I said it seems to me that the two things 
go together, and it’s not an accident that the Frankfurt School talks about ideolo-
gies very often as if they were poisoned utopias. Ideologies and utopia are the flip 
sides of the same coin, you want to analyse ideologies to set free the utopian ker-
nel. And the last one was about hierarchy. Of course, there is a really important, 
although tremendously complicated discussion in Benjamin about the rebellion 
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of Korah in the Book of Exodus and the role of hierarchy in that, which is a mon-
umentally interesting discussion but terribly difficult. I’m trying to get away from 
a focus on these traditional issues like hierarchy, and I don’t want to be put in a 
position in which I must say every hierarchy is bad, because of course it depends 
what you mean by hierarchy. The term comes from hieros arche, sacred rule, and of 
course everybody is against hierarchy because we are against sacred forms of rule, 
but we use the term hierarchy today to refer not just to sacralized forms of rule but 
also to functionally necessary forms of rule. There are also hierarchical relations 
in this room, you can all speak in Serbian in this room, and I can’t keep up with 
that, that’s a hierarchical relation. I think it’s a mistake to be hyper-leftist about 
the notion of hierarchy just as it’s a mistake to be hyper-leftist about the notion of 
egalitarianism. I think what’s important is to get some notion of the positive, de-
cent life that one can live and to get rid of those hierarchical structures and those 
forms of inequality which are incompatible with that, but that’s different from fo-
cusing specifically on hierarchies. 
Marjan Ivković
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory 
University of Belgrade, Serbia
My question concerns one uncertainty regarding your concept of realism in rela-
tion to the task of the engaged theorist to open up space, through non-doctrinary 
utopian thought, for reflection and the envisaging of alternatives, including radical 
utopian alternative to the existing social order in the public debate. So, in light of 
your Hegelian orientation, you have frequently argued in favour of historicizing 
or, more precisely, genealogical in Nietzschean and Foucauldian terms, account 
of societal phenomena. An account of how things have come to look this way, how 
they have come to be assembled this way from various sorts of bits and fragments, 
how they have come to assume this particular shape or meaning over the course 
of history, as I understand the basic explanatory mode of genealogy. So, how all 
kinds of symbolic phenomena, including our sense of self, and therefore also sense 
of what our interests are, have come to be. And it even seems to me that you prefer 
this genealogical, which I would call non-normativist form of social critique, but 
still a form of critique, to any normativist type, including the standard version of 
critical theory, and Adorno, who does have a normativist standpoint. 
As I understand you, the genealogial operation is essential for the breaking of 
the grip of the dominant ideology, above all liberalism, on our thought. The dom-
inant ideology which portrays itself, or which even has succeeded in becoming, to 
a greater or lesser degree, the common sense. For example, the notion that free-
dom can only be thought as the property of an atomistically conceived self, as ab-
sence of coercion, this has, more or less, entered the realm of everyday speech, 
although it’s a crucial part of the dominant ideology. Now, genealogy is therefore 
also an essential first step toward the creation of space for non-doctrinary utopian 
thought, or rather the creation of favourable conditions under which it might be 
to any degree endorsed by actors as an invitation for further reflection, for posing 
questions. On the other hand, it seems to me, a realist explanation of phenomena 
the way you conceive of it, is premised upon a rather non-historicizing, classical 
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Marxist understanding of certain phenomena in terms of objectivity, like the ac-
tors’ objective interest. So, this concept of objective interest, as I see it, has also 
permeated everyday speech and become part of common sense, from an opposite 
direction than the liberal conception of negative freedom. But it’s still a form of 
petrification of thought, of a non-historicizing way of relating to ourselves. Isn’t a 
realist explanation in this sense somewhat opposed to what I would call the count-
er-intuitive sentiment of genealogical explanation, and doesn’t it to some extent re-
inforce the existing limits of what it is possible to say, instead of opening up space. 
Or, to use a more Adornian language, isn’t realism also a part of systemic thought? 
It is my belief that the fundamental political struggle today is over the meaning 
of the content of terms such as autonomy, freedom, so the fundamental task is to 
wrest these concepts from the petrified form in which they exist today as part of 
dominant ideology. It seems to me that genealogy is perfect for this task, but real-
ism seems to petrify these meanings further.
Aleksandar Matković
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, 
University of Belgrade, Serbia
My question was in a sense posed by other members of the seminar, and concerns 
the relation between utopian thought and ideology. So, I’ll just try to crystallize 
what we may term the role of utopian thought in two main political traditions of 
Europe, Marxism and liberalism. What’s interesting to me, in these two politi-
cal and theoretical currents, is how they differently conceive of utopian thought. 
Marxism has a pretty interesting history in the usage of utopian thought, but as a 
literary genre. For example, it uses it to historicize itself, if you recall Marx’s and 
Engels’ talking about compiling a list of literary genres that would present social-
ism and the historical tendency of European society. Kautski even wrote on More 
being a socialist, in France there was a movement that read More with the workers 
and envisage the future society based exactly on the utopian genre. Even Marxism 
itself could be considered as constituted as a critique of utopian thought. 
On the other hand, it is interesting that in the liberal and even neoliberal imag-
ination, utopian thought is very positively, even uncritically accepted as being con-
stitutive of some versions of the free market. If you recall Mandeville and the Fa-
ble of the Bees, which has the subtitle ‘private vices, public benefits’, it’s how these 
contradictions between our needs and desires actually conflict one another and 
produce a better society for us all. That is one of the premises of the free market, 
and I think this sort of utopian thought has in a sense been extended to neolib-
eral ideology today as we know it. For example, yesterday you spoke of Marga-
ret Thatcher and there is no alternative statement. I also recall Milton Friedman 
who even had a television show which was sponsored by Ronald Reagan, where he 
would go, as this sort of neoliberal ethnographer, to different parts of the world, 
to Singapore, Berlin, etc. and speak about how the free market could function. He 
was this utopian ethnographer, who pointed out that this was the free market, it 
could function like that at home, etc. You could even recall Ludwig Gerhardt in 
Germany who used media extensively to implement Marktwirtschaft in Germany 
and the German society. 
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So I think that Thatcher, Friedman and Gerhardt are examples of how neolib-
eralism used utopian thought to constitute itself, and I think that this repeats it-
self, not only on the level of a literary genre, but on the level of abstract economic 
thought. I think this is a great problem, that even when you don’t have philosoph-
ical and literary thought, you can have economic thought that is utopian, precisely 
because it does not question itself. If you think about what are the two main points 
that liberal critique, or self-critique, revolves around, those are the first two points 
that you outlined. Free market still doesn’t exist, we need to bring it to existence, 
to somehow conceive it. It somehow transcends our schemes of categorization of 
reality, an instrument that would make our society better in a sense. And what’s in-
teresting is that this utopian thought actually pretends to be anchored in reality, it 
seems it is always in this sort of transition, which is important for Eastern European 
societies, this transitology, that we are supposed to reach this sort of utopian soci-
ety. Which is very interesting because, if you think how liberalism presents utopi-
an society, it is actually divorced from itself, from its own economic infrastructure. 
This is for me an important point because there is no complete theory of uto-
pia, utopian thought does not address these phenomena, and I find in your lecture 
a very important contribution to addressing these very issues. Think about the end 
of history, Fukuyama, think about the idea that here we are, we realized this utopia, 
and then when we saw that it doesn’t function, we fall back to the two points that 
you outlined, that it still doesn’t exist, that it somehow transcends our categories 
of today. Hence, I think that my main question would be how you envisage this re-
lation between ideology and utopian thought, or have you for example commented 
upon different strands, such as the sociology of knowledge by Karl Mannheim, or 
with this sort of tradition. Basically, what’s your conception of ideology and utopia?
Tamara Petrović Trifunović
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory 
University of Belgrade, Serbia
Keeping in mind that utopian thinking should not necessarily be understood as a 
set of injunctions for immediate action, I still have a question regarding the possi-
bility of realization of utopian thinking in the sphere of professional politics and 
governance. While in theoretical work and in everyday life of the individual (but 
also as a constituent of the politics of resistance), the goal of relying on utopian 
thinking in coping with and in overcoming the conditions of our situation seems 
attainable if not necessary, what do you envisage as constraints in putting in mo-
tion and (maybe more importantly) continually relying on utopian thinking by those 
occupying the positions of political power? This is more so taking into account the 
inherent constraints of political sphere and the role of political discourse in the 
perpetuation of the symbolic domination and the status quo.
That is: even if the hypothetical political actor is determined to overcome those 
constraints, what do you see as obstacles to stepping out of the politics-as-usual in 
contemporary societies? Politics-as-usual here being understood as the politics of 
the possible encompassing some elements of moralism (where utopian is not al-
ways rhetorically most effective) together with tendencies towards the narrowing 
of the discursive space for discussion.
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In other words, how do the criteria of (im)possibility, in your opinion, differ 
between theoretical and political fields?
Raymond Geuss
May I try to respond to these in reverse order? The third question is about the role 
of utopian thinking in actual politics. You talked a bit about obstacles to stepping 
out of the everyday form of politics and about the conditions under which politi-
cians might constantly appeal to utopian speculation. I have a former student who 
is a professor in South Africa, who constantly is confronted with the question – 
during the struggle in South Africa against apartheid, politicians continually ap-
pealed to something which is a form of moralizing discourse, namely natural rights. 
If you look at the way the African National Congress and their representatives for-
mulated their demands, they were in terms of human rights. And the idea was that 
human rights were a transcendent, non-empirically specifiable entity, and they 
played a role in this. From the South-African perspective, I am constantly getting 
people who say: you say that human rights don’t exist, but that is a very unrealis-
tic position to take. Look, you can’t understand what happened in South Africa if 
you think that human rights are merely an illusion. That’s what the people thought 
they were doing, you have to take that seriously. 
And, my view is that of course one must take very seriously what people think, 
and if one wants to be a realist in politics one has to correctly cognize what people 
think, what views they have, what concepts they hold, and one must have a good, 
clear idea of what the power structures are. But, from the fact that you need to un-
derstand these things correctly in order to be politically effective, it doesn’t follow 
that you need to endorse them. It is the case that in South Africa people thought 
that natural rights, human rights were the thing that motivated them to do what 
they did. But all sorts of things can motivate people to act, from the fact that you 
recognize that I’m motivated to act by some conception it doesn’t follow that I need 
to endorse that conception. Think of Lukacs who talks about the English Civil War, 
he says the English thought they were arguing about the nature of the Eucharist, 
whereas they were arguing about something completely different. So I would say 
that that’s the sort of answer I’d give to that, you have to both look at the internal 
perspective and the external perspective; in other words, you’re not honouring peo-
ple by endorsing what you have good reason to think is a misconception on their 
part, even if they’ve used that misconception to get a goal that you think is a good 
goal. I think it’s part of the responsibility of intellectuals to take seriously what 
people think, take it very seriously, but also not simply to identify themselves with 
whatever they happen to think. That’s the kernel of correctness in Lukacs’ theory 
about imputed class consciousness. You have to know what people think, but you 
have to be able to have an analysis of the situation which allows you to judge that. 
Aleksandar, I come from a particular context, I’ve lived for 20 years in Britain 
in a university where the only philosophical activity available is a certain pretty 
debased form of analytical philosophy, which still believes that there are facts and 
there is an ontological distinction between what’s possible and what’s not, and 
you have to take account of the facts. So I’m very keen to fight a particular battle, 
which is a battle which says that, no, the facts are not everything, and even talking 
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about the facts means you’ve construed the facts in a particular way. In a way, that’s 
probably irrelevant to people in this room, because you don’t need to be told that, 
you’re interested in more sophisticated things. In a way, I do speak as if utopianism 
is something good but, of course, you’re absolutely right, utopianism is good if you 
mean by utopianism the view that the world is not constituted simply by facts that 
are pre-given. Compared to that, the theoretical position that recognizes that, in 
order to even see what the facts are, you have to go beyond them, utopianism in 
that sense is necessary and good. 
But that doesn’t mean that every particular configuration of utopian thought is 
good, and you’re absolutely right, neoliberalism is a form of utopian thought that 
is deeply ideological. The free market is a construct, it never exists, and in fact we 
have good reason for thinking, not only that it does not exist, but that it never could 
exist, because it’s dependent. You can’t marketize everything, because the market 
presupposes an existing structure, which allows the market to operate, which can’t 
itself be marketized. So the market, by its very nature, can’t be the end of the sto-
ry; t’s inherently contradictory, but it is a utopia, and it has the structure that you 
can always say: it doesn’t work because we don’t have enough of the market. So all 
things that are associated with that, the idea that market is perfect, that it’s never 
wrong – I have a friend that works in the publishing industry, who publishes eco-
nomics books, and he says: an economist is a person who thinks that the market 
is never wrong, except in the case of their own books. And in a way that’s telling. 
So I agree with that completely. 
Then of course, you’re going to say (and its perfectly legitimate) if it’s not the 
case that all forms of utopia are good, how do we tell which ones are good and 
which are bad, and then of course I say what you know I will say, which is that you 
can give some general principles about that, such as the ones that are cognitively 
closer to what we see the reality is like, but with those general principles you can’t 
get an algorithm that will separate them, in the final analysis you will have to de-
cide on the basis of contextual factors. Then you are going to have to ask me what 
context means, of course. I’ve been through this – and then I’m going to have to 
say: context itself is something that can only be contextually determined. And then 
you’re going to say, well at that point, doesn’t anything go? And I’m going to say 
no, it doesn’t follow from the fact that everything is contextual, and that you can 
only say contextually what counts as the context, that you can’t make some distinc-
tion between what is reasonably to be taken as context. So I say, it depends on the 
context, you say – what’s the context; I say the context is contextually specified; 
you say how do I contextually specify the context; I say, that is something that can 
only be contextually specified. Then you say, haven’t you lost the plot there, and 
I say – no, because to say that what the context is can only be contextually speci-
fied is not to say there are no criteria at all for saying what it is, it’s to say that the 
criteria that there are, are in that context. So, from the fact that there is always a 
further context, it doesn’t follow that in any given context, anything goes as the 
next context. And at that point, generally, the discussion stops, and I don’t know 
whether it stops because I’ve won or lost, or because people have become fatigued.
Marjan, there are three entities, and you are asking quite rightly, again and again, 
about the relation between them. Actually, there are four – there’s realism, which 
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I’ve talked about as the opposite of moralism. There’s social critique, or ideolog-
ical critique, there’s genealogical analysis, and there is utopia. I take a lot of the 
questions to be essentially questions about the relation of those things. What’s 
the relation between them - I wrote the first book on Ideologiekritik, then I wrote 
a book on genealogy. What’s the relation between Ideologiekritik and genealogy? 
Then I wrote some stuff on realism – what’s the difference between realism and 
Ideologikritik, etc. So first there is a general question about the elucidation of that, 
second there is a specific supposition that you have, which is that, really, for the 
kinds of concepts that are most important in the modern world, your suspicion 
is that genealogical analysis will be the one that will turn out to be most useful. I 
don’t myself think that genealogical analysis is going always to be as powerful per-
haps as you take it to be. 
In a genealogical analysis you analyse the way in which different components 
come together accidentally. Let me give one example – Foucault – we have a cer-
tain conception of feminine psychology. We had at a certain time in Western histo-
ry this conception that certain features naturally come together, that women had a 
unitary psychic structure composed of a number of facts, and those facts were not 
put together at random, they held together, they had a kind of Wahlverwandschaft, 
there was an elective affinity between them. So, therefore, you can treat women as 
a unitary category, you don’t have to worry about it. It’s a SelbstverstAEndlichkeit, 
something that’s obvious, taken for granted. Genealogical analysis analyses ways 
in which that appearance of unity and semantic coherence is an appearance, and 
it’s actually just the result of a contingent set of things. But of course, I can do that 
kind of genealogical analysis on almost anything, and it will be illuminating. So I 
can do that kind of analysis on my own conceptions of university career, etc, and 
there will be various components that come together there. From the fact that it’s 
contingent, that these identities are contingent, it does not follow that I will re-
ject them. I might think that the identity of being a philologist is something which 
has an accidental history, that’s actually very good. So from the fact that I analyse 
them genealogically, I’m not necessarily motivated to reject them. To be motivat-
ed to reject them, it seems to me, I need also to see the role that they play socio-
logically in the world. 
I need to see that thinking about women in that way is not something that ev-
erybody realizes and enjoys and now we can go on. I have to see not just that it had 
a certain history, but that it functions in a certain way, it functions repressively in 
a certain way. And I have to focus my analysis on that aspect of the situation too. 
So for me, an analysis that’s genealogical, an analysis that’s in your terms realis-
tic in terms of the power relations that are involved in the constitution, and an 
analysis that’s ideological, that talks about the way this functions in society, are 
compatible, and they are compatible parts of social criticism as a general enter-
prise. The general enterprise of social criticism needs a number of different ways 
of dealing with things, and we have to throw light on phenomena in a number of 
different ways, and I’d be very loath to reduce that simply to genealogical analy-
sis. I think, for example, that for the notion of autonomy and the notion of free-
dom, it’s very important to see how those notions actually function in the society 
in question. It isn’t enough just to see where they come from and, I think, to see 
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how they function, you need to see that against the background of an imagina-
tive conception.
Let me give you an example: my father was a steel worker in the United States, 
he worked on a railway that moves steel around from one part of the steel mill to 
another. I could have told him a genealogical story of great complexity about how 
that particular kind of work environment came to be organized, how it could have 
been organized differently, was organized differently in Japan, in other countries 
– it was only because there was a conjunction of this and that that the identity of a 
worker got established. This wouldn’t in itself have moved him in any way to think. 
Every genealogy has within itself the possibility of being transformed into a ped-
agogy, in the terminology that I use; that is, he could, or would have seen it as a 
story of success. Yes, all of these accidents needed to come together for this won-
derful thing to happen, this social role of a worker in the steel mill who has these 
things. To convince him to change his mind, you would have needed to talk more 
about the way in which that role prevented him from doing certain sorts of things, 
and that means contrasting it with certain possible other functions that could have 
been satisfied by elements of this conjunction of things. And to do that, I think you 
need a kind of imaginative going beyond of the actual story, which won’t necessar-
ily just be given by a genealogical analysis. 
Predrag Milidrag
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory 
University of Belgrade, Serbia
Just two short questions. Could you tell us in what measure the philosophy of 
Ernst Bloch is still relevant for utopian thinking today. Is there any place in utopi-
an thought today for his notion of the fatherland, Heimat? In Serbo-Croatian it is 
‘zavičaj’. The second question concerns negative utopia. Does utopian thought to-
day think negative utopia at all? Is there any place for that notion? Is it necessary 
to define negative utopia through the totalitarian systems, or can we define it in 
some other way? For example, the film trilogy Matrix – a perfect world, perfectly 
virtual world, where people do not know it is virtual, and they live their lives with-
out knowing that they are controlled all the time. Is it a kind of negative utopia; is, 
after all, negative utopia a utopia at all?
Božidar Filipović
Faculty of Philosophy 
University of Belgrade, Serbia
My questions have already been to some extent answered today. They are not so 
interesting and intriguing. In order to pose the questions, I have to underline three 
important moments of your presentations today and yesterday. You have said that 
a ‘utopian proposal cannot be directly implemented and acted upon’, or, in other 
words, utopia is ‘not a blueprint’. You have also been critical about the privileged 
position or viewpoint of the colonial master. We should ‘abandon the literary fic-
tion of an author who purportedly surveys a society at rest, and takes it all in’. And 
finally you said that ‘it is not difficult to see that human society will never exist 
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without conflicts’. I’m pointing out these because of the question of criteria. When 
I say criteria I mean criteria for distinguishing between utopia and non-utopia, 
and by non-utopia I don’t mean dystopia or negative utopia, I mean any political 
project. On the other side, I think that it’s important to raise the question of crite-
ria for distinguishing between utopian and non-utopian thinking. To be more pre-
cise, my question is, is it possible to have utopia without a privileged position, the 
viewpoint of the colonial master? How to know whether some society is close or 
closer to the utopian ideal, and some other further from it? And, if we have uto-
pian projects of negotiation, or consent, can there be such a thing as unintended 
utopia, utopia without subjects, without privileged actors or position who will tell 
us what utopia is and what is not? 
Also, you said something about the difference between utopia as totality, as total 
society which is included in utopia, and utopia as micro-utopia or micro-project. 
And you said something about the relationship between, on the one side, desires, 
needs, preferences and acting, and how this is connected. My question is, do we 
need experimental or empirical utopias to test all possibilities? Is it possible, if we 
don’t have micro-utopia, but just the totality or whole society – can we test those 
relations between acting and wishing, acting and needs, preferences and so on?
Bojana Radovanović
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, 
University of Belgrade, Serbia
The variety of utopia that you are in favour of, if I understood correctly, is the one 
that focuses, not on the picture of a perfect world, but rather on those human de-
sires and needs that continue to torment us, but are incapable of being satisfied 
under present social circumstances. I would like to go back once more to needs, 
and I will build on what Jelena already said. You pointed out that needs are histori-
cally determined, some are luxurious, some are necessities. What is today a luxury, 
tomorrow might be a necessity. I wanted to ask whether utopian thought should 
be focused on luxuries or necessities, but I think you already said that it should be 
focused on vital human needs. However, what is a vital human need in the United 
States might be a luxury in Ethiopia. So should a utopian thinker from Ethiopia 
be focused on what is a vital need in Ethiopia or a luxury there, or what is a vital 
need or luxury in the States? Should there be some benchmark? Also, yesterday 
at the end of your talk you said that the main question is what should be done so 
that everyone leads a dignified life. And you said that the answer to this question is 
not the equality of resources, not the equality of material goods. This reminds me 
of Amartiya Sen, who is also against the equality of material sources, because this 
equality wouldn’t do justice, for example, to the disabled, who would need more 
resources to achieve the same level of functioning as someone who is not disabled. 
Today you said that, if I again interpreted correctly, that you are against this equality 
of material resources because of the instability. If everyone has the same amount of 
resources today, tomorrow we would again end up in inequality due to exchange. 
So is this the only reason? Finally, I would like to ask you how you would define 
dignified life, whether it is dependent on context or not.
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Raymond Geuss
May I start with Predrag. Ernst Bloch. There is one thing in Ernst Bloch that I 
think is of exceptional importance and that is his notion of excess, or his notion 
of going beyond, or his notion of surplus. And his idea that even minimally taking 
account of the world appropriately means going beyond what in some sense is the 
mere content of the experience. I think that’s really important, to have some no-
tion of a semantic. I’ve always thought that Marx talks about Mehrwert, and, in a 
way, Bloch talks about Mehrsinn, surplus meaning. I’ve always thought this is ab-
solutely crucial, and you can’t find it in many other people (you find it in Adorno). 
Then you asked the specific question about Heimat, and that of course is a very 
difficult concept to deal with. I don’t have any solutions to this, but I think it is im-
portant to try to detach a reasonable and laudable attachment to one’s local con-
text from nationalism. The neoliberal model is the model of a flat world, and we 
don’t want to live in a flat world. I want to come to Belgrade, because I don’t want 
to think I’m in Rimini or in Duesseldorf when I’m in Belgrade. If I am in Belgrade, 
I want Belgrade to be itself, and to be in some sense expressive of the people who 
are here, to be an appropriate locus, a place. It’s of course an unsolved problem, 
how you can maintain that theoretically and practically and yet avoid some of the 
evils associated with excessive nationalism. And I have no solution to that, but, 
within limits, then, I would say that, yes, I think there’s nothing wrong with Serbs 
wanting to live in a Serbian place where they feel at home. That’s a perfectly rea-
sonable thing to do. The crucial thing is detaching that from nationalism, and, of 
course, as you know, in a lot of cases, people have found that it’s possible to culti-
vate certain local traditions better in a non-national context. The big hope of the 
European Union was that a lot of small states wouldn’t need to be nationalistic in a 
politically deleterious way because they would have security, you wouldn’t need to 
have a militarized Belgium because Belgium would be in a larger context in which 
some of its security needs would be met, and so you could get rid of the distorting 
influence of a lot of these structures and you could concentrate on other things. 
I know that is no solution to the problem, but that’s the best I can say about that. 
The second question was about negative utopia and, of course, I think that there 
are two slightly different things there. One is the notion of dystopia, and the other 
is the notion of negative utopia. The notion of a dystopia is the notion of an exag-
geratedly bad place, a place which is extremely bad. The notion of a negative utopia 
is the notion of an imaginary state of affairs which would be better than the state 
of affairs that’s presented in a work of literature. When Adorno says that Berg’s 
Wozzeck is a kind of negative utopia, it means that you should read that work in 
the context of it having utopian significance, although you can’t formulate what the 
utopian significance is, it points out the negativity in that state of affairs. And do-
ing that makes you more aware of the possibility and necessity of something else. 
And I think that’s a slightly different structure from the structure of dystopia. And 
the question about whether we can only imagine dystopia relative to totalitarian 
regimes: no, I think we can imagine all sorts of dystopias that are not particularly 
connected with what we know about totalitarian regimes. There’s a very nice neo-
liberal dystopia that we can imagine, of course not. 
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Božidar, three questions there. The possibility of any kind of utopian thinking 
without a privileged standpoint. Well, yes and no, namely, as I said in response to 
the earlier question, of course utopia has to presuppose that there is a kind of priv-
ileged standpoint in the sense that a utopian theorist has to think that he or she has 
analysed a problem relative to which they have a better solution, there is something 
definitive about that. So to that extent there has to be a privileged position. But, of 
course, when we talk about the privileged position of a colonial administrator, we 
don’t mean the privileged position in that sense. The colonial administrator has a 
privileged position that is connected to a whole apparatus of power. Every time I 
make an affirmation, in some sense I’m claiming a privilege because I’m claiming 
that what I’m saying is right. If privilege means privilege in that sense, then yes of 
course. But if privilege means privilege in the sense in which we train people in 
Cambridge and they go to India and have the power of life and death in this whole 
area, then not privilege in that sense. 
Then there was a question about testing and utopia. That’s of course the Pop-
per question, namely isn’t there some way in which you’ve left the realm of that 
which is testable, if you have a project that is not piecemeal but universal. Because 
if you have a universal project, the notion of testing the project makes no sense. Of 
course, I can drink water once and then twice, but I can’t live my life and then live 
it over again, I can’t live my first life as an experiment, and then do it the second 
time around learning from that. There’s some way in which testing doesn’t play a 
role in this. There’s some way in which testing can’t play the kind of role in human 
life as a whole that it plays in experimental science. And that’s my answer to that, 
namely that I think it’s not a problem with the theory, it’s a problem with human 
life, that in some sense we have to live our lives as the unique phenomena that we 
know them to be. We can’t repeat them, human societies can’t ever go back. And 
that means that there are going to be limits on testing, testability and the role of 
testability doesn’t mean there is no place where you can talk about testability, but 
it will depend on very complicated analogies, thinking analogically about the Ro-
man Empire, about Japan, etc. It won’t be a test in the standard way, but that’s not 
an objection to utopian thinking, it’s a fact about human life. And then your third 
question was about unintended utopias. Yes, the genuine utopia would be one in 
which you wouldn’t know you were living in a utopia. Because why would you have 
to know it’s utopia if it were completely perfect? 
Bojana, another very important thing. And here again I’m on weak ground, I 
know. This is the question of what used to be called in critical theory the Adresaten 
der Theorie, who is the theory directed at. Does the Ethiopian theoretician direct 
her discourse to other Ethiopians, to everyone in Africa, to everyone in the world, 
to some imaginary cosmopolitan community, etc. And then, won’t there be parallel 
differences in what counts as needs? The second question is about dignified life. The 
answer to that is: I don’t see that one of those can possibly exclude the other. You 
can’t nowadays, it seems to me, talk just to a Serbian audience or just to an Ethiopian 
audience, or just to an American audience, because the world is actually a place in 
which communication takes place. And you’re not going to be able to. So it seems 
to me you’re absolutely right, there’s going to have to be a really complicated pro-
cess of mediation involved, in which you take account of what’s happening in the 
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rest of the world, but you also direct your statements to the people you are actually 
talking to. Let me take a better example, Somalia. As you know, in Britain it’s a big 
problem that many Somalians think it’s part of their social life, their form of life 
that there be genital mutilation of women, they engage in genital mutilation. Until 
very recently, the British government did not prosecute those people. It was a big 
change about six or seven years ago, when the government decided they were not 
going to allow Somali immigrants to genitally mutilate their girls, they were going 
to be prosecuted for that. They passed the law that said that doctors who suspected 
this had the responsibility and duty to report this, and they would be prosecuted. 
So you can’t any more simply direct your remarks about what is a vital necessity to 
the Somali community or to the British community or to the worldwide communi-
ty, you have to take account of all those at the same time. Now, how you’re going 
to do that, I wish I had an answer to that question but I don’t. 
Dignified life – you’re right, I don’t know what to say about that, but let me give 
you an example of what I have in mind. At one time you could lead a perfectly good, 
simple life – this is perhaps an imaginative embellishment of what was actually the 
case, but you could buy good, nourishing brown bread that wasn’t very expensive, 
wasn’t very high quality, but you could eat bread, you could eat paprika, you could 
eat some cheese, wasn’t very high quality, but it was available. We are moving now, 
in Britain, to a world where you can’t get simple nourishing food unless you have 
a lot of money. If you go to the shops and buy what is on offer there, you’re poi-
soning yourself. You’re getting agro junk that’s produced, that tastes like nothing, 
has addictive substances in it. And if you want to get something that is actually 
eatable you have to pay more money for that. So you’re connecting the possibility 
of leading a decent life with having enough money to do that. 
I’m not saying that I think it’s irrelevant how goods are distributed, I’m not saying 
it’s irrelevant whether many people have a lot and nobody has anything. Of course 
it’s important that we don’t have ten wealthy people who own the world. But what 
I’m saying is, just as Marx said, don’t focus on distribution, focus on production, 
focus on relations of production, not of distribution. If you focus on relations of 
distribution you’re never going to get anywhere at all. That doesn’t mean that dis-
tribution is irrelevant, it doesn’t mean that at all, it means you are only going to 
understand what’s going on if you don’t focus on the subordinate phenomenon, 
the distribution, and you get to the root of it, namely you get at the ways in which 
it’s produced. And that’s what I’m saying, when I say of course you should think 
about distribution of medical services, etc, but don’t fall into the trap of thinking 
you can understand everything simply by assuming that human value is defined by 
monetary resources, and therefore we have to distribute them. 
Think that there’s something to that, and independent of that, and it’s not dis-
connected from that, but it is something like leading a decent, dignified life, having 
the ability to get what you need, and you can do that, you can imagine a society in 
which you can do that even though there are still discrepancies in people’s income. 
I think that was the thing Marx thought, of course there will be differences in peo-
ple’s consumption habits, some will consume more, some less, but basically there 
was enough for everyone. Think of Harry Frankfurt’s objection: it isn’t important 
that everybody gets the same, it’s important that everyone gets enough. Or think 
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of the book by Avishai Margalit about the decent society, that’s what I’m saying. 
Don’t follow rules and think: we accept that everything’s going to be monetarized, 
we accept that, of course the whole world is going to be monetarized, and now 
we look at the distribution of monetary resources, that’s all we have to do. What 
I’m saying is don’t think about it that way, think about it in terms of actual human 
self-affirmation, activity, leading a decent life, dignified life, look at that and look 
at patterns of distribution as connected to that, and look at the way this is possible 
in a given society relative to different patterns of distribution.
Đorđe Pavićević
Faculty of Political Sciences 
University of Belgrade, Serbia
One question is about the conditions of possibility. You said that you’re against di-
rect realization of any utopia and whether this includes some kind of self-reflection 
– I’m thinking about direct realization in terms of revolution, external interven-
tion, like Plato thinks about the external ruler. If we have to restrict ourselves in 
the realization of our utopian ideas, does this include a kind of self-reflection that 
we have to think that part of our ideas is utopian? In terms that we cannot expect 
that we can realize them directly, and we have to accept some stubborn facts about 
reality, life or to adapt our mode of social and political action to these facts. I’m 
asking this because I think that most of utopian thinkers – we are considering them 
utopian – were not self-consciously utopian, in terms that they believed that their 
ideas were utopian. I’m thinking about 19th century thinkers, for example Saint-Si-
mon, Fourier or even nationalist utopias like Manzini or ideas about harmony, in-
side the national state. To be brief and precise, I will restrict myself to one other 
question. I’m trying to figure out what is the difference between your conception 
of utopia and many other theories of realistic utopia that are based on Rousseau’s 
injunction that we have to take account of men as they are and laws as they might 
be. My question is whether there is any essential distinction between this concep-
tion (later Rawls, for example, has this idea of a realistic utopia, even some sociol-
ogists like Olin Wright have an idea of real utopia) and your conception of utopia?
Rastko Jovanov
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, 
University of Belgrade, Serbia
I’m going to be very brief. The first question is a methodological one, as it should 
be in every discussion. I cannot see the place of utopian thinking in philosophy, 
the space of that thinking in the philosophical field. Where is it? If I’m going to 
write in those utopian terms, am I going to write as a practical philosopher or as 
a practical politician, or is it the same as theoretische Vernunft? Also, do you want 
to rehabilitate utopian thinking, or do you think that utopian thinking should be 
our new way of critical thinking, because thinking is always a way of critical think-
ing? It’s critical of Dasein, Institution, bestehende Institution. In that manner, how 
can you defend utopian thinking against those liberal criticisms of utopia from the 
middle of the last century? 1947, utopian nationalism, Popper, and after that, in the 
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50s and 60s, they criticized utopian thinking as a way of thought that leads not to 
peace but to struggle. I’m not fond of that, but my question is how you intend to 
defend your way of thinking against those liberal criticisms of utopian thought? 
Utopian thinking emerges after the First World War, Mannheim, Buber, Rosenz-
weig, Benjamin, Bloch – why? Where do you find a fruitful field for utopia – in 
international law. Why? Because we still don’t have any stable definition in inter-
national law. And utopia should be there where the struggle is. 
Petar Bojanić
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, 
University of Belgrade, Serbia
Just two questions. One is some kind of invitation for you to explain to us, because 
you sent us this second chapter of your new book, Realism and the Relativity of 
Judgement, and you didn’t send us the first chapter, “Dystopia and Elements”. You 
used this chapter several times in the beginning of your lecture. This chapter is 
very interesting because you are talking about analytical philosophy. Would you 
be kind to tell us where is the place of utopian thinking in philosophy, probably in 
some kind of antagonism to political philosophy. Second, I’m not sure that this is 
one possible kind of utopia or paradise. Here you don’t have a group, you have one 
agent (the egg), there is no collective intentionality, group agency, you have diges-
tion, probably collective, but you know very well – I mentioned that in Fourier, for 
example, you have the action without limits, where he imagined a huge work with 
500 000 people to change something in Sahara. Or you have for example the big 
Babylon Tower, as a huge construction of group work, group agency and acting to-
gether. I’m asking this because generally we are making the group with some kind 
of language. Because you use direct action and immediate action several times in 
your text, but generally you mention Plato. 
Utopia, as you said, is first of all a description, you are doing something with 
words, as we are doing today. Also, it is a literary genre, and at the beginning of 
the text you are talking about the commonplace, because topos is commonplace. 
In Aristotle’s Rhetoric you have this commonplace as a possibility (if you are us-
ing commonplace all the time, here we have some kind of group constitution). 
This is important because this is not commonplace, this is topos without topos. On 
the second page you said that this is Plato, that construction of utopian thinking 
is something which is done only with words, that means language. In that place, 
The Republic (592a–b), Plato said, ‘I understand’, this is a dialogue, ‘you mean the 
city whose establishment we have described’, this is only by words, ‘the city whose 
home is in the ideal, for I think that it can be found nowhere on earth’. ‘Well, said 
I, perhaps there is a pattern laid out in heaven for him who wishes to contemplate 
it, and so beholding to constitute himself as citizen’. ‘But’, Plato said, ‘it makes no 
difference whether it exists now or will ever come into being’. Here I’d like to have 
your commentary – we are using some kind of projection, using language not in 
a performative way – I didn’t plan to talk, as I saw that all the others are engaged, 
but I’d like to talk because I’m obliged to be part of the group. Here we have some 
kind of projection in utopian thinking, and this projection could be something 
that connects us. 
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Raymond Geuss
First Đorđe. As you know, I have a lot of criticisms of Rorty, but he did say one 
thing that I thought is right, and I think it’s a quotation from someone else. He says 
‘it’s a sign of civilization that you can know that your own beliefs are contingent, 
your own values are contingent, and you can stand by them’. Not of course in all 
circumstances, but I can see that if I hadn’t been born in the United States in a par-
ticular window of time and contingently had the education that I had, which was 
only possible during a brief period of time, I wouldn’t have the values that I have. 
The values that I have are highly contingent and problematic, and yet I stand for 
some of them. I think that’s the answer to your question about utopians who do 
or do not realize they are being utopians. I want to say, just as in every other case 
– think of Schiller between Naive and Sentimentalishe Dichtung, there are naïve 
poets who just talk about the world, and there are sentimental poets who reflect 
upon their own ways of looking at the world. And these are two different ways of 
being a poet. There are different ways of being utopian – there are people who 
make utopian projections but do not know they are utopian, there are people who 
do things, like the people who set up the Limoge cooperative, who don’t realize 
they are engaged in a project that will work for 100 years but will stop working. 
There are unreflective and reflective people. In the modern period, we have lit-
tle alternative but to be reflective about what we do. But I don’t see there is any 
reason why I can’t quite rightly say I’m committed to some sorts of views, I know 
that’s utopian, they are not going to come about, but the very fact that I stand by 
them is a cultural fact. 
Rousseau and realistic utopia. My problem with Rawls’ notion of realistic uto-
pia is that it seems to me his realistic utopia is neither realistic nor is it utopian. 
It’s not realistic because it’s never going to come about, it’s not utopian because 
it’s just an idealized ideological description of the American form of government, 
so it’s not utopian, it’s not really different from what exists. So for me, that’s an in-
stance of an ideological construct, not a utopian one. I know that’s not an answer 
to your question, and I wish I could give a better one. There’s nothing in general 
in my way of thinking which says that this can’t be possible. As I said in response 
to Predrag, there are different forms – one is the utopia that can be realized, then 
there’s a Kantian utopia which has the form of something which inherently can’t 
be, and then there are utopias which are opening up different ways of thinking 
about things, but not actually making a view on things. So there is nothing in my 
view that makes that impossible. 
Rastko, I must confess that I’m not actually that interested in philosophy per 
se, I’m not interested in disciplinary boundaries, I think that philosophy has to be 
integrated into the rest of the world, and I come from a culture where there’s what 
seems to be a stultifying and demented interest in patrolling the boundaries of that 
which is philosophy. The boundaries of philosophy are clear, everything that’s not 
philosophy is devalued, and I think the result of that is that philosophy becomes 
more and more limited. In Oxford you can’t study philosophy without another 
subject, in Cambridge you have a single subject in philosophy. And that means 
that the only topic is the structure of the human mind and language. It strikes me 
they are very important topics, but they are not all. There is no aesthetics, political 
UTOPIAN THOUgHT BETwEEN wOrDS AND ACTION350 │ rAYmOND gEUSS
philosophy, no real ethics. Bertrand Russell says in his 1910 book: ethics is not about 
acting, it’s about the structure of propositions that have a certain form. That’s ex-
actly what I’m trying to get as far away from as possible. I want to say ethics has to 
do with acting, with good acting and of course the structure of propositions about 
what is good is an important topic to study, but not to the detriment of thinking 
about pictures, action, about getting yourself together and all of this. So, I think 
my real response to you is maybe what I do isn’t philosophy and maybe this analy-
sis of utopian thinking isn’t really relevant to philosophy as it’s constituted now. I 
wouldn’t be terribly concerned by that, because sometimes in my life I’ve been in 
philosophy faculty, sometimes in political science. I’m more interested in thinking 
about things than in disciplinary boundaries, I think disciplines are necessary but 
the boundaries, the imposition of boundaries is becoming increasingly a detriment 
to serious thought, rather than a contribution to it. 
Your second question was about the liberal criticisms of utopian thinking after 
the war, and actually, in a way, the whole project is directed against Popper and 
against Berlin. This is all against the poverty of utopianism and the Open Society 
and Its Enemies, so I can’t say in one sentence what my response to it is, because my 
response is that we should continue to do this in a way which makes sense, which 
is different from anything he said. As I said in couple of places in the lecture, I try 
to turn some of his points against him. He thinks that because we can’t predict the 
future of science we can’t have utopian thinking. But, of course, you can turn that 
conclusion around, you can say because we can’t predict the future of science, how 
do we know what’s going to be impossible tomorrow? So you can take that point 
and run exactly the opposite way with it. If you look at the paper actually sotto 
voce, between the lines, if you can think of footnotes to Popper between the lines 
of every paragraph, that’s my answer to it, that’s one way of seeing the whole paper. 
The third thing you asked is why there is such an upsurge in utopian thinking 
after the First World War. Of course, there had been utopian thinking before that, 
there was More, Campanella, Fourier, we all know about this. But there was a big 
upsurge of it after the First World War. In Germany, which had been defeated – 
and it doesn’t seem to me that you need to be a sociologist to think that being mas-
sively defeated in a war to which you’ve invested your national resources is a good 
breeding ground for trying to think about different ways of organizing the world. 
There’s nothing worse than success. Success is bad, because it makes you compla-
cent. Even worse than that is half-success. Britain thinks it won World War II. Well, 
yes and no. There were also the Yugoslavs, Russians and Americans, so it’s not that 
they won World War II. That configuration allowed Britain to fail to take the kinds 
of thoughts about itself that people in the rest of Europe did, which is: there were 
problems before the war, we have to change things. In Britain people thought you 
could reconnect with those things and continue on. So winning the war is not very 
good, it makes you complacent, half-winning the war is bad because it makes you 
self-deceived. French have their own version of that, which is, ‘we were all in the 
Resistance’. Well, not actually true. Losing a war, however, is also not a good thing. 
I mean, the conclusion is that war is not good, whether you win it or lose it. If you 
win it, you’re stultified, if you lose it, you are destroyed. So I think that the outburst 
of utopian thinking at the end of the war was a response to poverty, degradation, 
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the clear sense that something had gone wrong, that people had to try something 
else out, and that released this flood of thought. 
Petar, you didn’t say this, but I’ll try to put words in your mouth. There’s a really 
important task which is the construction of agency, the construction of a ‘we’. How 
do we become a ‘we’? How do we get a sense that we have common purposes, com-
mon goals, and what role can utopian projects play in this? We were talking about 
the British political system, and the fact that the conservatives succeeded in con-
vincing a large number of members of the working class to identify imaginatively 
with the aspirations to being members of the middle class. And if you can identify 
imaginatively with those aspirations, of course you’ve won the political discussion. 
A similar thing can happen if you engage in common projects. As you begin to en-
gage in common projects, that’s not just a question of thought or forms of thinking, 
it’s a form of action, of interaction. If you have a common project, writing a grant, 
you’ll meet every day, and if you meet every day you’ll get to know one another, 
and if you get to know one another, that will lead to the generation of new needs, 
as Marx says – you’ll want to see one another. I don’t mean to reduce that, and, as 
you said, this image is not an image of collective action, it’s an image of collective 
consumption, and not even collective consumption. I absolutely agree that that’s 
not a model for human life, human life has to be more active and has to be about 
the constitution of agency, collective agency. 
This is, however, an image of a peasant’s idea. If you’re a peasant in the 16th cen-
tury, you might have the idea that it would be nice not to have to have collective 
action. The peasants didn’t have to be told about collective activities then, they 
were out in the fields all the time in collective activities. Their utopian conception 
was Sabbath, end of the day, rest like this. That’s a utopian conception, it’s not a 
good utopian conception for us, because we are confronted with completely dif-
ferent problems. We are confronted with the problem of getting ourselves togeth-
er, constituting ourselves as subjects who can’t be pushed around by other people, 
and who have a locus of our own generation of thoughts and actions and values. I 
completely agree with that and think that it’s tremendously important, but I would 
say that in that project of collective action, words can play a role and they must 
play a role, and they’ll play a role in different ways. They will play a role in every-
day interactions in which you talk with one another, everyday forms of discourse, 
they’ll play the role of essays you might write and read together. They’ll play dif-
ferent sorts of roles and I want to expand the spectrum of things that can play a 
role in that. So, construction of agency. And that’s connected of course with what 
you quite rightly said – that a lot of utopias are connected with projective uses of 
language, rather than interactive uses, we’re projecting different ways in which we 
could talk with one another. 
Then finally you ask about analytical philosophy; well I’ve written this paper in 
the book called ‘Dystopia, the Elements’, which is about why I think analytical phi-
losophy had an important historical role around the time of the First World War, 
but is actually now completely run out of steam and is now rather repressive and 
an impoverishing way of thinking about the world. That’s what’s in the first chap-
ter of the book there. And that’s part of the project of trying to defend at the same 
time utopianism and criticism: thinking of the task of utopian thinking, criticism 
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and these tasks of the positive generation of collective forms of agency. I’m think-
ing that analytical philosophy plays little positive role in any of these. It played a 
certain positive role in criticism for a while, and still does.  Analytical philosophy 
has one strength which is the attention to the critical use of language, which is very 
important. We must be clear about the language we use, about the meanings we 
use, but there is no such thing as absolute clarity. Absolute clarity does not exist, 
and the pursuit of clarity in analytical philosophy has become an end in itself in a 
way that is self-destructive. To say that something is clear is to say it’s clear enough 
for me in a context in which I’m trying to do something, and that’s not an absolute 
magnitude, that’s a relative magnitude. To aboslutize that, as certain form of ana-
lytical philosophy does, is a mistake. I try to talk about that there, and in another 
paper that I wrote in the last collection called Vix Intellegitur, which is about Ci-
cero’s comment on Thucydides, which is that some of the sentences in Thucydides 
can barely be understood, and what does it say about the world, if you have a major 
historian that’s written statements that can barely be understood. And why certain 
forms of failure of complete clarity might have some value and how in any case the 
idea that clarity was an absolute magnitude is a mistake. 
